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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, a
corporation
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

FRANK H. FULLMER, DAVID H.
FULLMER and WILLARD L.
FULLMER, JR., individually, and
as co-partners doing business under
the name and style of FULLMER
BROS., a co-partnership; WILLIAM
L. PEREIRA doing business as WILLIAM L. PEREIRA & ASSOCIATES ; WILLIAM L. PEREIRA &
ASSOCIATES, a corporation; and
ALLEN STEEL COMPANY, a
corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
10258

ANSWER AND REPLY
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT
All matters preliminary to the Argument have
been adequately discussed in the opening briefs submitted herein. While Appellant Prudential (hereinafter referred to as Appellant) takes issue with
certain matters set forth by Respondent Pereira
(hereinafter referred to as Respondent) in its Statement of Facts, for the sake of simplicity Appellant
will discuss these matters in relation to the particular points of law to which these matters pertain.
1
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APPELLANTS ANSWER TO RESPONDENT'S
CROSS APPEAL
ARGUMENT
POINT I
UNDER UTAH LAW, THE ACTIVITIES OF RESPONDENT CLEARLY CONSTITUTED DOING
BUSINESS IN UTAH.
A. JURISDICTIONAL FACTS

The following" facts of record in this case are
clearly sufficient to sustain the trial court's finding that Respondent was at tall times material hereto
doing business in the State of Utah:
1) As the Architect Agreement between Appellant and Respondent discloses, Respondent undertook and agreed to perform extensive architectural,
engineering and supervision services in connection
with the design and construction of the five-story
Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association
Building in Salt Lake City. (Ex. A, R. 77 et seq.)
Among other things, this Agreement required Respondent's full-time supervision during the construction period, and Respondent expressly contracted to
furnish the services of a qualified superintendent
to reside in Salt Lake City during the entire construction period. (Ex. A, R. 78, pam. 5 ( c ) ) .
2) The building project in the instant case
was commenced early in the year 1962 (Complaint,
R. 16, para. I l l ) , at which time Respondent sent
Mr. James S. Manning to Salt Lake City to perform the supervisory services above mentioned.
2
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(Pereira affidavit, R. 123, para. 9; Manning affidavit, R. 31, para. 6).
3) Mr. Manning opened an office in Salt Lake
City, and the name "Wm. L. Pereira & Associates"
wias listed on the first floor directory of the building. (Kershisnik affidavit, R. 104, para. 2).
4) Mr. Manning engaged a secretary and instructed her to answer the phone "William L. Pereira & Associates." Moreover, Mr. Manning obtained
a listing in the Salt Lake City telephone directory,
in both the regular and yellow classified sections,
for William L. Pereira & Associates, listing a Salt
Lake City address. Significantly, this listing also
appears in the most recent Salt Lake City Directory, published in June, 1964. (Kershisnik affidavit,
R. 104, para. 2).
5) Respondent on its letterhead stationery
designated Mr. Manning as "Resident Architect,
125 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah."
(Kershisnik affidavit, R. 104, para. 2).
6) In 1964, Mr. Manning opened a checking
account in the Beehive State Bank in Salt Lake
City in the name of William L. Pereira & Associates. (Kershisnik affidavit, R. 104, para. 2).
7) During the period from 1962 through
1964, Respondent engaged in extensive business
operations other than Appellant's project, including
design and supervision of a building for Brigham
Young University lat Provo, Utah, involving gross
construction costs of approximately six million dol3
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lars ($6,000,000). (Kershisnik affidavit, R. 104,
para. 3 ; Donovan affidavit, R. 100, para. 11).
8) Respondent directed Mr. Manning to
"drum up" additional architectural business for Respondent in Salt Lake City, and Mr. Manning in
fact actively solicited such business throughout the
period from 1962 to 1964. (Kershisnik affidavit
R. 104-105, para. 3).
9) Respondent prepared certain schematic
and preliminary plans and drawings in connection
with a proposed residence in Salt Lake City for Mr.
Gene Donovan, Appellant's President, for which
services Respondent was paid fees in the approximate amount of $1,300.00. (Pereira affidavit, R.
122, para. 4).
10) William L. Pereira has individually held
a license to practice architecture in the State of
Utah since 1954. (Staten affidavit, R. 116, para.
11).
11) Respondent performed full time architectural services in Salt Lake City with respect to Appellant's project as late as June 11, 1964. (Manning
affidavit, R. 149, paras. 4-5).
12) Respondent on July 21, 1964, submitted
its statement showing fees which it claimed were
owing from Appellant on its project in the total
amount of $255,573.15 as of that date. (R. 163).
B. APPLICABLE LAW

Respondent argues that under Utah law, architectural services performed over a period of two
4
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years and involving the construction of two multimillion dollar buildings in Utah constituted mere
"isolated transactions," not constituting a continuing activity with in the State. (Respondent's Brief
pp. 15-16). First of all, it is significant that the
Utah Legislature in defining the requirements
whereby a foreign corporation must qualify to do
business in the State, exempted such corporations
from the registration requirements of Utah law, if
only a few isolated transactions were involved and
were completed within a thirty day period, (Section
16-10-102 (j) UCA 1953 the Utah Business Corporation Act) Obviously, the Legislature never intended that continuous and extensive activities occurring
over a two year period could be considered as "isolated transactions."
Moreover, the cases which Respondent cites in
support of its position are clearly inapplicable. The
case of Marchant, et al., v. National Reserve Company of America, et al, 103 Utah 530,137 P.2d 331,
cited by Responderit at page 13 of its Brief held
that where the sole corporate activity in Utah over
a four year period was the execution of four deeds
for the conveyance of land, the corporation could
not be held to be doing business in Utah. The Conn
v. Whitmore case, 9 U.2d 250, 342 P.2d 871 (1959),
cited at page 14 of Respondent's brief, involved the
single sale of two horses and is obviously an isolated
transaction. The East Coast Discount Corporation v.
Reynolds case, 7 U.2d 362, 325 P.2d 853 concerned
the question whether plaintiff should have qualified to do business in Utah, to entitle it to bring
5
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suit in Utah courts; consequently, this case is not
helpful in determining the proper limits of jurisdiction over non-resident defendant corporations.
Finally, the Western Gas Appliances v. Servel, Inc.
case, 123 Utah 229, 257 P.2d 950, cited by Respondent at page 14 of its Brief is easily distinguishable,
for it involved a foreign corporation which had no
office, telephone, property or employee in Utah, and
which neither solicited or miade any direct sales of
goods in Utah, except to wholesale distributors.
The following Utah cases fully support the
lower court's finding herein. Industrial Comm. v.
Kemmerer Coal Co., 106 Utah 476, 150 P.2d 373
(1944) held that defendant nonresident corporation was doing business in Utah within the meaning
of Section 104-5-11, Utah Code Annotated 1943,
which section was identical to present Utah Rule
4(e) (4). It based its finding upon facts strikingly
similar to those involved in that instant case:
"In the instant case the defend'ant maintains
an office in this state at its own expense for
the convenience of its resident agents who
solicit business for it here and also that these
agents may be in a position to furnish it reports of any business opportunities which
might become available here. Its name is listed in the telephone directory, the building directory in v^hich it maintains this office and
also on the door of the office. It makes a regular and continuous attempt to solicit sales of
its coal to consumers in Utah through these
employees." (150 P.2d at pp. 374-375).
6
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In McGriff v. Charles Antell, Inc. et al, 123
Utah 166, 256 P.2d 703 (1953), Justice Henriod
made the following important observation directly
applicable to our situation:
"To date the pattern, which in a changing
world is ever changing, excludes solicitation
alone as justifying jurisdiction conferred. Beyond such solicitation the activity to confer
jurisdiction must be of sufficient substance
and of such scope and variety as would leiad
a court of last resort to conclude that immunization of the foreign corporation against the
power of our forum would be unrealistic, unreasonable and a vehicle for oppressing or
meting out injustice to our own local citizens"
(256 P.2d 'at p. 705, emphasis added).
Similarly, in the instant case, it is at once
apparent that immunization of a foreign corporation engaged in and responsible for the design and
on-site supervision Of multi-million dollar public
and private building projects within this State
clearly would be unrealistic and unreasonable, for
in Respondent's business, the potential risks of
harm to persons and property in Utah is far greater
than in the typical sales situation involved in the
cases upon which Respondent so heavily relies.
In Dykes v. Reliable Furniture & Carpet, 3
U.2d 34, 277 P.2d 969 (1954), Justice Henriod reaffirmed this Court's position that mere solicitation of sales would be insufficient to constitute doing business, and stated that the requisite "something else" in addition to solicitation should be:
"such as would inspire in a reasonable person's mind the conviction that such outsider,
7
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as a practical matter, is present in the state
personally or by authorized representation, to
further his business interests with local inhabitants through real and identifiable contracts representing a continuity of dealing
and activity not too dissimilar from that indulged by local business people attending to
their own business pursuits. (277 P.2d at p.
972).
Appellant submits that from the facts set forth
hereinabove, it is clear that Respondent held itself
out to be, and in fact was for over two years present
in this State by authorized representatives who conducted its business; that Respondent's course of
conduct and that of its local representatives was substantially similar in continuity and activity to the
normal course of conduct generally pursued by every
local architect; that the work being done was the
result of specific and identifiable contracts for that
work and requiring local representation; and that
the present lawsuit arises directly out of these contracts and that work.
Finally, in Conn v. Whitmore, supra, Justice
Crocket reviewed the line of United States Supreme
Court cases commencing with International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90
L. Ed. 95 (1945), which case established the rule
that due process requires only that the non-resident
corporation have certain minimum contacts within
the state, such that invoking jurisdiction against
it does not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice. Justice Crockett concluded
that in order to subject a corporation to the juris8
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diction of the courts of a foreign state the following
test shall be applied:
"There must be some substantial activity
which correlates with a purpose to engage in
a course of business or some continuity of
activity in the state so that deeming the defendant to be present therein is founded upon
a realistic basis and is not a mere fiction."
(342 P . 2 d a t p . 874).
Appellant submits that the substantial activities of Respondent over the two year period involved
herein clearly justify this Court in sustaining the
lower court's finding that Respondent's presence in
Utah is founded upon a realistic basis and not upon
a mere fiction.
Respondent, at pages 5 and 16 of its Brief,
suggests the novel proposition that a foreign corporation should not be considered as doing business in
this State if it performs such business in Utah at
the request of the other party. Respondent cites no
authority to support this proposition, and indeed
no such authority exists. Clearly, the reason why
Respondent was doing business in Utah is utterly
immaterial to the instant question. At any rate, Respondent's statement that its resident architect was
stationed in Utah at Appellant's request is false, for
the record shows that the Architect's Agreement
itself required Respondent to provide a resident
architect in Salt Lake City during the construction
period. (Ex. A, R. 78, pam. 5 (c)).
Respondent, at page 18 of its Brief, argues that
"at the time of all services of summons in question
9
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in this case, Pereira's representative was no longer
stationed in Salt Lake City, nor was there any necessity for his presence here." Thus, Respondent contends that service of process was invalid for the
reason that Respondent had previously withdrawn
from the State. The fact remains that Mr. Manning
was in the State doing business for Respondent when
he was served. Respondent's assertion that its representative was no longer needed in Salt Lake City
simply is contrary to the facts. (See Point II (B),
infra). In any event the question is moot since there
is no merit in Respondent's legal contention. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Houston Fearless Corporation v. Teter, 318
F.2d 822 (10th Cir. 1963), recently rejected this
argument, fas follows:
"In further support of its position that it was
not 'doing business' in Colorado, appellant
points out that its corporate officer, upon
whom service was made, was only in the state
for a single day and that, after the termination of the agreement with Teter, it did not
maintain an office, employee or representative in the state. This is true but it is hardly
controlling here. 'A foreign corporation which
has ceased to do business in a state is still
subject to service of process in suits on causes
of action which arose out of business carried
on by the defendant in the state.'" (318 F.
2d at 827).
The view expressed by the opinion cited is also
expressed in the following cases and authorities:
In 1 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and
Procedure, Sec. 179, p. 697, footnote 98; Electrical
10
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Equipment Co. v. David Hamm Drayage Co., 217
F.2d 656 (C.A. 8th 1954).
See also Westcott-Alexander Inc. vs. Dailey,
264 F.2d 853, (C.A. 4th 1959) and Ives v. Kinney
Corporation, 149 F. Supp. 710 (Ga. 1957) and 20
C.J.S., Corporations, Sec. 1920, p. 170, footnote 39,
and the extensive cases cited thereunder and in the
pocket supplement.
Respondent in Paragraph 3, page 18 of its
Brief claims there is no support anywhere in the
record for the lower court's finding in paragraph 2
of its Amended Judgment (R. 156) that "James S.
Manning^ departure from Salt Lake City, Utah on
or about June 11, 1964 was motivated in part by a
desire on the part of the corporate defendant architect not to be served in the prospective Prudential
lawsuit.'' Respondent then cites Mr. Manning's affidavit as containing the reasons why Mr. Manning
left the State on June 11, 1964. On this point, Appellant brings to the attention of this Court the fact
that Respondent knew prior to June 11, 1964 it was
going to be sued (Donovan affidavit, R. 97; Staten
affidavit, R. 116), and Mr. Manning immediately
after he was served with summons in his Hotel
Utah room on June 25, 1964 told Mr. Kershisnik,
"that they knew this was going to happen and that
Continental Casualty Company had told them
months ago to get out of the State of Utah and stay
out." Also, "He further stated that they nevertheless felt an obligation to perform the services for
Prudential in 'accordance with their contract and
11
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bad informed Continental that they were going to
do this regardless of the consequences, and that they
had continued to maintain their offices in Salt Lake
City until such time as the pressure had become so
great that Manning had to leave." (Kershisnik affidavit, R. 108).
APPELLANTS REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S
BRIEF
POINT II
SERVICE UPON JAMES S. MANNING WAS PROPEE AND SHOULD BE UPHELD.
A.

MR. MANNING WAS A REPRESENTATIVE OF
RESPONDENT UPON WHOM SUMMONS WOULD
PROPERLY BE SERVED.

At page 6 of its Brief, Respondent contends
that Mr. Manning was not within the class of persons qualified to receive service under Utah Rule
4 (e) (4). The pertinent portion of this Rule provides that service upon a corporation shall be undertaken as follows:
"If no such officer or agent can be found in
the state, and the defendant has, or advertises
or holds itself out as having, an office or place
of business in this state, or does business in
this state, then upon the person doing such
business or in charge of such office or place
of business."
The case of W. L. Beard v. White, Green and
Addison Associates, Inc., 8 U.2d 423, 336 P.2d 125
(1959) interpreted this rule as follows:
"Under that rule the person served must be
more than a mere employee. He must be in
12
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charge of some of its property, operations,
business activities, office, place of business
or in some manner be responsible for or have
control over its affairs." (336 P.2d at p. 126,
emphasis added).
See also the following cases, holding that service is proper where the person served is held out to
be, or is Ian agent of the corporation in some degree
responsible for or in control of its affairs: Bristol v.
Brent, 38 Utah 58, 110 Pac. 356, 358-359 (1910);
Wein v. Crockett, 113 Utah 301, 195 P.2d 222, 228
(1948); Gibbons & Reed Co. v. Standard Accident
Insurance Co., 191 F. Supp. 174,176 (D. Utah
1960).
The record herein fully supports service upon
Mr. Manning in accordance with the principles of the
above cases. Respondent informed Appellant and
designated Mr. Manning as the person in complete
charge of the project, and las the person to whom anyone associated with the project was to turn for final
answers as far as Respondent's activities were concerned. (Donovan affidavit, R. 97, para. 3; Kershisnik affidavit, R. 104, para. 1; Peterson affidavit, R. 137, para. 3). Respondent both on its
letterhead stationery and in the classified pages of
the Salt Lake City telephone directory designated
and held out Mr. Manning as its "Resident Architect" in Salt Lake City. (Kershisnik 'affidavit, R.
104, para. 2) These facts are undisputed. Consequently, it is clear that Mr. Manning was represented as being, and in fact was an agent having requisite responsibility and control under the above Utah
authorities.
13
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B.

MR. MANNING WAS NOT ENTICED INTO UTAH
FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF SERVING HIM
WITH PROCESS.

Respondent has not attempted to analyze the
numerous authorities set forth at pages 14-28 of
Appellant's Opening Brief, nor does Respondent
offer any contrary authority. Respondent relies
solely upon cases involving settlement situations and
consequently inapplicable to the situation under consideration as discussed at pages 28-32 of Appellant's
Opening Brief.
Respondent has misstated the facts relating to
the enticement issue in two material respects. First,
at pages 7 land 22 of its Brief, Respondent states
that by June 11, the construction period of the
contract was over and Mr. Manning's supervision
was no longer required. As pointed out in Appellant's Opening Brief, pages 8 and 23 - 26, there
remained unperformed by Respondent numerous and
vital items of work required to be performed by
Respondent under its Agreement with Appellant.
In addition to Appellant's discussion of this issue
in its Opening Brief, the following facts of record
fully discredit Respondent's conclusions and unsupported statements.
Mr. Manning himself admits that the project
was not completed when he left Salt Lake City on
June 11, 1964, since the following items remained
to be accomplished by Respondent:
"A.

Administrative details and verification
of accounts.
14
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B.

Verification of completion of punch-list
items.

C.

The issuance of the Architect's completion
certificate."
(Manning affidavit, R. 149, para. 5)

The record also contains an elaborate description of the nature of these unperformed items of
work. Mr. Charles Peterson, construction superintendent for the general contractor, Fullmer Brothers, stated that the following work remained to be
performed by Respondent as of June 11, 1964:
1. Preparation of "punch-lists" to guide and
correlate the final activities of the various
trades, crafts and subcontractors working
on the project, in order to allow completion
of the building in a systematic fashion without delay.
2. Preparation of the final "punch-list."
3.
4.
5.

Approval of subcontractors' and suppliers'
bills and invoices.
Issuance of certain necessary change orders.
On-site supervision of numerous items of
work requiring Respondent's action or decision, including problems with respect to
the mechanical system, air conditioning,
window washing equipment, window glass
and floor coverings. (Peterson affidavit, R.
138-142; see also references to affidavits
at page 8 of Appellant's Opening Brief).
15
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Clearly, in view of these facts, Appellant was
justified in insisting that Mr. Manning return to
Salt Lake City to complete Respondent's work before the grand opening of the building scheduled
for June 29. Verification of final accounts and preparation of final punch lists could not have been
prepared in the absence of an authorized supervisory representative of Respondent making an on-site
inspection to determine if the work had been performed. As a matter of record, there were bills unpaid in excess of $300,000 for work performed prior to June 11 (R. 160, 162) to be investigated
and approved by Respondent as required by its
Agreement (R. 79, para. 5 ( j ) ) .
On pages 9 and 22 of its Brief, Respondent contends that on June 25, 1964, when Mr. Manning
returned to Salt Lake City, there existed no critical situation requiring his presence. As pointed
out in Appellant's Opening Brief, pages 23-26, the
opposite was true. Appellant had scheduled its grand
opening for June 29. As early as June 11, the work
had proceeded to the point where Respondent's onsite supervision was essential in order to determine
what work had been completed, what work had to
be done, what work was defective and had to be
remedied, what payments were due or were to become due, what claims should be allowed or rejected,
and what back charges should be made against the
contractor and subcontractors. These essential matters had to be resolved before Respondent could certify final payment and issue its completion certificate. These matters could only be resolved by a
16
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physical inspection of the work in Salt Lake City
to determine what work had been done, how it had
been done, by Whom it had been done and whether
it was fully completed. Apart from the contractual
relations this was manifestly necessary so that the
required certificates of occupancy from Salt Lake
City authorities could be obtained in time for the
scheduled grand opening on June 29. (Kershisnik
affidavit, R. 105-106, para. 5; Staten affidavit, R.
113-114, para. 4; Peterson affidavit, R. 140-141,
para. 9-10.)
That Mr. Manning's return to Salt Lake
City on June 24 was for the purpose of accomplishing these necessary items of work is apparent from
the record. On the morning of June 25, When Mr.
Kershisnik entered Mr. Manning's hotel room, he
observed a stack of correspondence approximately
four inches thick pertaining to the job, consisting
of invoices and correspondence dating back to the
first part of June, which had not been processed.
(Kershisnik affidavit, R. 108, para. 12).
POINT III
SERVICE UPON THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS
PROPER AND SHOULD BE UPHELD.

In its response to the extensive analysis and
compelling authorities set forth by Appellant in its
Opening Brief with respect to this point, Respondent relies solely upon highly technical and unconvincing arguments which cannot be determinative
of this matter. First, on pages 28-29 of its Brief,
Respondent relies upon cases relating to estoppel
17
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in its traditional sense as a defense based upon misrepresentation, reliance and injury. Obviously, the
numerous cases cited by Appellant in its Brief do
not use the term in such a restricted sense. Moreover, many of Appellant's cases base their decision
upon the alternative ground that by reason of defendant's doing business in the State without complying with state qualification statutes, defendant
has impliedly consented to service upon the Secretary of State of the State of Utah. (E.g., Clay v.
Kent Oil Co., 38 N.W.2d 258, 259-260 (S.D. 1949) ;
Wein v. Crockett, 113 Utah 301, 195 P.2d 222, 231
(1948), discussed fat pages 38-40 of Appellant's
Opening Brief.) Respondent fails to discuss this
alternative ground for sustaining such service.
On pages 32-33 of its Brief, Respondent cont2nds that since the record shows that Respondent
never qualified to do business in Utah, this Court
cannot make a contrary presumption. Respondent's
sole authority for this argument is the case of
Lubrano v. Imperial Council, O.U.F., 37 Atl. 345
(1897). First of all, Respondent overlooks the case
of Flinn v. Western Mut. Life Ass'n., 171 N.W. 711
(Iowa 1919), discussed at pages 35-36 of Appellant's Opening Brief, wherein the court stated that
since state law required defendant corporation to
qualify to do business and appoint the state auditor
as its agent, "it will be conclusively presumed as
against the corporation that it did comply with such
requirements, and its rights will be determined on
the theory of such compliance." (171 N.W. at p.
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713, emphasis added). Moreover, Respondent failed
to quote the following language from the Lubrano
case, supra, which immediately precedes the quoted
portion set forth in Respondent's Brief:
"It will thus be seen that in those cases where
the defendant appeared and pleaded to the
jurisdiction, by setting up the fact that it
had not appointed some one authorized by it
to laccept service of process, as required by
statute, the courts uniformly held that this
could not be allowed, the defendant being
estopped from setting up its own misconduct."
(37 Atl. at p. 247, emphasis added).
Thus, the court in Lubrano noted that the principle of estoppel is uniformly applied in cases such
as that at bar where defendant actually appears
and raises its failure to comply with state law in an
attempt to avoid jurisdiction. In Lubrano, defendant never appeared in the action to contest jurisdiction.
On pages 34-35 of its Brief, Respondent quotes
certain language from the Model Business Corporation Act Annotated to the effect that section 108
of the Act (from which Section 16-10-111 of the
Utah Code was adopted) "leaves to other statutes
or to the common law the question of service of
process on foreign corporations which do not qualify
to transact business in the State." (Vol. 2, p. 620,
emphasis added). The principles of estoppel iand
implied consent are such common law principles,
and have been applied in a majority of cases to statutes such as Section 16-10-111. Thus, the com19
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mentary in the Model Act so heavily relied upon
by Respondent fully supports Appellant's position.
Finally, Respondent cites without discussion
several cases noted in 18 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of
Corporations, Sec. 8742. Appellant has already pointed out, on pages 34-35 of its Opening Brief, that
While contrary authority exists, the weight of authority supports Appellant's position. (23 Am. Jur.
Foreign Corporations Sec. 499, p. 513). Moreover,
Fletcher recognizes that a "difference of opinion"
exists concerning this question, and cites scores of
cases applying the principles of estoppel and implied
consent before mentioning the few cases rejecting
these principles. (Fletcher, supra, pp. 622-626).
None of the five cases cited by Respondent are convincingly reasoned, and at least one such case, Rothrock v. Dwelling-House Insurance Co., 37 N.E. 206
(Mass. 1894) is clearly distinguishable, since defendant in that case never appeared in the action
and had no notice of the suit until judgment was
rendered against it.
POINT IV

SERVICE UPON GEORGE W. MOONEY WAS PROPER
AND SHOULD BE UPHELD.
A. MR. MOONEY WAS A REPRESENTATIVE OF
RESPONDENT UPON WHOM SUMMONS COULD
PROPERLY BE SERVED.
At pages 11 and 38-39 of its Brief, Respondent
contends that Mr. Mooney was not a proper person
upon whom service is permitted under Utah Rule
4...(e) (4). Appellant has discussed the requirements
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of this Rule hereinabove, in connection with Point
II (A). With respect to the facts, the record discloses that Mr. Mooney was held out to Appellant
to be, and purported to be the Construction Superintendent or Chief Superintendent of Respondent,
and was so named in various progress reports prepared by Respondent during construction of Appellant's project. (Donovan ^affidavit, R. 100, para. 12).
Respondent has never denied that such representations were made to Appellant, or denied that they
were true. Moreover, Mr. Mooney was identified to
Appellant as, and identified himself as being one
of the superiors of James S. Manning, Respondent's
resident representative in Salt Lake City. (Donovan
affidavit, R. 100-101, para. 12). Again, Respondent
does not deny these facts. Finally, Mr. Mooney frequently reviewed the progress of the Appellant's
project, consulted with Mr. Manning and with Appellant's officers concerning performance of the
work and of Respondent's obligations thereunder,
and performed similar duties for Respondent in
Provo, Utah in connection with a project for Brigham Young University. (Donovan affidavit, R. 101,
para. 12).
Mr. Mooney himself admitted that at the time
he was served with process, he was in Salt Lake
City to discuss with Appellant's representatives and
others, certain problems with respect to the air conditioning system in Appellant's building. (Mooney
affidavit, R. 119, para. 6) Respondent's President,
21
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William L. Pereira, admitted that Mr. Mooney was
an employee of Respondent and that Mr. Mooney
assisted Appellant in connection with construction
of its building during the construction period. (Pereira affidavit, R. 124, para. 12).
Thus, it is clear that Mr. Mooney was doing
business in the State of Utah on behalf of Respondent, and was held out to be, purported to be, and
was a person having sufficient responsibility and
control for this Court to sustain service upon him
under the authorities discussed hereinabove.
B. THE FILING OF A MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE
OF SUMMONS DOES NOT IMPAIR THE RIGHT
TO SERVE ADDITIONAL SUMMONS UPON DEFENDANT.

Respondent, at pages 39-42 of its Brief, argues
that Appellant had no right to serve Mr. Mooney
while a motion to quash service upon Mr. Manning
was pending. Respondent relies solely upon the
case of Farris v. Walter, stating that no contrary
authority exists. Respondent does not discuss or
even attempt to distinguish the case of Lane v. Ball,
set forth at pages 43-45 of Appellant's Opening
Brief. Moreover, Respondent's statements that the
Farris case is "squarely in point", and "has been
cited many times" are erroneous and misleading.
Appellant has already discussed and distinguished
the Farris case, at pages 46-47 of its Opening Brief.
After a thorough examination of Shephard's Pacific
Citator, Appellant has found not one case citing the
22
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Farris decision on the point at issue. Obviously,
Respondent would have cited in its Brief any authority supporting Farris if such existed.
Respondent contends that to allow additional
service of summons While a motion to quash the original summons is pending would require the court
to perform "useless adjudications." In fact, the
converse is true, as pointed out in Appellant's Opening Brief: Service of a second summons not containing the alleged defect of the first summons
would render moot the pending motion to quash, and
would justify its dismissal. Respondent misconceives
the principle of mootness, for it raises a situation
wherein the court would be "at work determining
questions made moot by plaintiff's unilateral action" in serving additional summons. Clearly, since
such questions are made moot by additional summons, they will not be determined by the court, but
will be dismissed. (27 C.J.S., Dismissal and Nonsuit, Sec. 55, p. 401, and cases cited).
CONCLUSION
We submit to this Honorable Court that Respondent has failed to assert cogent and convincing authority or analysis in support of any of the
questions at issue herein. On the basis of the authorities cited herein, and in Appellant's Opening Brief,
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we respectfully ask this Court to reinstate the service of process upon Respondent William L. Pereira
& Associates.
Respectfully submitted,
FRANKLIN RITER
822 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
EARL P. STATEN
604 El Paso Natural Gas Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
THELEN, MARRIN, JOHNSON &
BRIDGES
111 Sutter Street
San Francisco, California
Of Counsel
Attorneys for
Plaintiff and Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
day of
March ,1965,
copies of the foregoing Answer
and Reply Brief of Plaintiff and Appellant were
served upon Shirley P. Jones, Jr., Attorney for Defendant and Respondent William L. Pereira & Associates, a corporation, 411 American Oil Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
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